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Abstract Against a backdrop of definitions and conceptual clarifications of the term
urban policy, including its expression in the developing world—and Africa, in
particular—this paper reviews the trajectory of urban policy in South Africa post-
1994 and comments on future directions and plausible scenarios. In a highly specific
context-dependent analysis, the paper argues that, in the first 10 years of democracy,
we have seen the creation of democratic, integrated development local government,
mass delivery of housing and services, a finely crafted array of capital and operating
subsidies for delivery to lowincome households, and a number of programmes
intended to enhance the capacity of local government to undertake delivery. All of
these have been centrally driven. The counterpoint to the national perspective and
frameworks, the paper argues—and in evidence over the past 5 years, in particular—
is the increasingly robust role and influence of cities in setting the urban agenda and,
in effect, leading urban policy. The paper concludes by examining the many points
that contribute to this view.
The Nature of Urban Policy
The development of most urban areas is influenced, to some degree, by the processes
of urban policy and urban planning. Urban policy and planning are generally
concerned with the management of urban areas. They are state activities that seek to
influence the distribution and operation of investment and consumption processes in
cities for the ‘common good’. However, it is important to recognise that urban policy
is not confined to activity at the urban scale. National and international economic
and social policies are as much urban policy if defined by their urban impacts, as is
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land use planning or urban redevelopment. In effect, urban policy is often made
under another name. Urban policy and planning are thus dynamic activities whose
formulation and interpretation are a continuing process. Measures introduced cause
changes that may resolve some problems, but create others for which further policy
and planning are required. Furthermore, only rarely is there a simple optimum
solution to an urban problem. More usually, a range of policy and planning options
exist from which an informed choice must be made.
Urban policy is also the product of the power relation between the different
interest groups that constitute a particular society. Foremost among these agents are
government (both local and national) and capital in its various fractions. Capital and
government pursue specific goals that may be either complementary or contradic-
tory. These political and economic imperatives have a direct influence on the nature
of urban policy. Urban policy is also conditioned by external forces operating within
the global system as well as by locality-specific factors and agents. It would also be
fair to conclude that urban policy making is the product of a continuous interaction
of intellectual process and institutional response, a process driven by successive sets
of powerful and relatively consistent value judgements which have a profound
influence on how urban problems are defined, and on the policies derived to deal
with them.
Urban Policy in the Developing World: Influential Waves
of International Research
Under the sponsorship of the World Bank who, as Rogerson (1989) writes,
recognised that urbanisation problems in the developing world had reached pro-
portions warranting serious consideration in overall national development policies
and that the formulation of coherent national urban policies was undeveloped in
most African, Asian and Latin American countries, a first wave of research in the
early 1980s argued that national urban policies should be conceived as a subgroup of
national spatial strategies primarily directed at urban rather than rural settlements.
The objectives of national urban policy were viewed as multidimensional in
character even if a few explicit goals might be stressed. Furthermore, due to the
geographical concentration of investments (in urban areas) and the high costs of
urban infrastructure, a set of national urban policy goals were often framed in terms
such as slowing the growth of the primate city, strengthening intermediate cities or
minimising urban–rural migration. The tendency to specify explicit spatial goals as
the prime objective of national urban policy was severely criticised. Rather, in
seeking objectives for national urban policy, it was essential to acknowledge that
such goals could not be “ends in themselves but are the means to achieve the general
aims of society” (Richardson 1983, cited in Rogerson 1989). Therefore, spatial
objectives, for example slowing down the growth of the primate city or minimising
rural–urban migration, were seen as only having merit as sub-goals in achieving
higher level societal goals. This view therefore posited that the core objectives for
national urban policy were the same as those of general national economic and social
policies and included inter alia the promotion of economic growth and efficiency,
improving equity and reducing poverty, satisfying basic human needs for all and
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preserving environmental quality. As Rogerson (1989) points out further, a number
of influential studies at the time agreed that it would not be advisable to set goals for
national urban policy that could be measured solely in quantitative terms, such as
limits to population growth or targets for individual cities and regions. The overall
policy goal would be to attain an optimal settlement pattern that maximises real
income for people regardless of where they reside. In terms of the actual form of
national policy, this body of work emphasised the inherent danger of assuming that a
general strategy would be applicable to all developing economies. Instead, country
uniqueness was emphasised and a typology of urban development strategies
subsequently emanated.
In the late 1980s, a second wave of research began to question the value of direct
location instruments in national urban policy, strongly arguing that indirect
mechanisms may be more appropriate, and de-emphasising spatial considerations
in favour of a ‘space-blind’ policy which becomes a key component of overall
economic and development planning. The observation is made by a number of
scholars that little evidence exists to support the view that experiments with national
urban policy conducted from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s (including those
embracing the framework described as the first wave of research) have been
successful. The most common explanation for the poor performance of national
urban policies across the developing world is seen to be the separation of national
urban policy from the national economic planning process and from the overall
context of macroeconomic and sectoral policies. In other words, in most developing
economies, national urban policy was often implemented in abstraction from overall
development strategies, with very little synergy between the two processes. National
urban policy was generally treated as a narrow sectoral responsibility for which a
national line ministry had overall responsibility. There was consequently little
integration between urban development policy and development planning in general.
The urban system was moulded independently of other policies, resulting in a failure
to recognise the powerful spatial impress exerted by macroeconomic forces on the
pace of urbanisation and the form and functioning of the urban system. In sum,
independently conceived spatial policy, for example those still fixated with the
‘primacy’ problem, still had strong resonance.
The African Experience: A Cursory Overview
The experience of African countries in formulating and implementing urban policy
over the last two and a half decades has been haphazard. Urban growth has taken
place exceedingly rapidly, with all evidence suggesting that urban populations will
continue to grow much faster than rural populations even if the urban bias in
development strategies were reversed. Whilst the rate of the continent’s growth may
be lower than other regions—due primarily to Africa’s marginalisation in terms of
trade, investment and infrastructure development (Halfani 1996)—and theories
abound about a slowdown in the rate of growth of some of the largest cities and of
polarisation reversal or spatial deconcentration into polycentric metropolitan forms
(Pacione 2005), the fact of the matter is that Africa is becoming increasingly
urbanised. What is therefore needed, argues Hope (2001), is the development and
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implementation of appropriate national urbanisation strategies, influenced from
country to country by the economic, social, political and cultural characteristics that
exists within each or, as the point has been made above, a set of strategies that takes
into account the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the nation states, and indeed
cities, in question.
Now whilst urban policy alternatives (see above section) were available over the
last two decades with which urban policy makers in the developing world could
experiment with, the urban situation in Africa has made it exceedingly difficult to
implement a uniform set of policy precepts so that at any given time a range of
interventions seemed to coexist, from spatially explicit urban policies in some parts
of the continent to more ‘space blind’ initiatives elsewhere to yet a combination of
the two in others. Perhaps, the exception has been Kenya where national urban
policy, instead of being treated as a self-contained area of policy making (explicit
spatial policy intervention to restructure the national urban system), has more
recently rejected the premise that the urban system can be thought of independent of
other policies and has recognised the formidable spatial impress that macroeconomic
forces exert on the pace of urbanisation and the structure and operational efficiency
of the Kenyan urban system. The point made by Evans (1989) here is that national
urban policy in Kenya is no longer concentrated on the form and pattern of the urban
system in the context of a postulated end-state; rather, the urban settlement system is
viewed largely as an outgrowth of the macroeconomic policy context.
The unique and differing situation among African cities which, as pointed out
above, has historically made it difficult to implement a set of policy principles in any
sustainable manner results from a range of spatial and demographic factors. Three
are worth mentioning here. Firstly, definitions of urban and rural vary widely across
Africa. Many African countries use a population size of 2,000 as the cutoff between
rural and urban settlements. However, the figure varies from 100 in Uganda to
20,000 in Nigeria and Mauritius. Almost half the countries in Africa use a numerical
definition to indicate the areas that qualify as urban (UNCHS Habitat 2001). The
second has to do with the different patterns of urbanisation in West and East Africa.
In many West African countries, there are few secondary cities, resulting in the
population being concentrated in one or a few large cities. Population growth in East
Africa is more evenly distributed over secondary and tertiary cities. But there, also,
primary cities are going through a period of rapid growth. The patterns of
urbanisation in North and Southern (especially South) Africa have also been in
stark contrast (Pillay 2004a, b). Thirdly, whilst an older body of literature has often
described a general model of the African city based on the existence of an
indigenous core and the distribution of different ethnic groups according to density
gradients which assigned low-density land use to the administrative and residential
requirements of the colonial elites and high density to indigenous populations, the
situation in most African cities at present is hardly analogous. Post-colonial
transformations of African cities, characterised by a greater mixing of economic
and residential land uses, has resulted in a variety of forms (Pacione 2005),
underscoring the point made above that any set of urban development strategies has
got to factor in the unique and distinctive spatial morphology inherent in most





Urban policy pre-1994 in South Africa was based predominantly on the dictates of
apartheid spatial planning, with the precise form of the South African city being
codified by the 1950 Group Areas Act and the notion of segregated urban space. It is
little wonder, therefore, that current urban policy is founded on an intention to
reintegrate cities and move towards more compact urban forms. As Todes (2000) has
observed, visions akin to the urbanist ideals of Jane Jacobs (1961) offering
opportunities for higher density living, proximity between home and work, land
use mix and social integration are prevalent. Alternative discourse of city
development emerged as planners, and urban scholars mounted a huge critique of
urban apartheid. Less divided urban forms were proposed in an integrated city and
coordinated development framework. Negotiated during the inclusive forum
processes that characterised South Africa’s transitional period (Pillay 2004a, b)
and endorsed, as Todes (2000) goes on to reveal, by neoliberal technocratic bodies
such as the Urban Foundation (1990) and World Bank (1991), these ideas soon
became the dominant discourse and were effectively embodies in legislation by the
new government. As Pieterse (2004) has remarked, urban integration was seen as
providing the ultimate panacea to the many intractable problems that mark South
Africa’s cities, emerging strongly in the ‘recently’ published Draft White Paper on
Urbanisation and before that at the core of government’s 1997 Urban Development
Framework. Harrison et al. (2003) note cautiously, however, that there is real and
growing concern that government’s ‘neoliberal’ (market-orientated) turn may be
exacerbating social and class divides and may be prioritising South Africa’s standing
in the global economy at the expense of its poorest citizens. Robinson (1998) has
argued too that such a technocratic discourse could become another oppressive form
of urban ordering—a physicalist meta-narrative imposing a single moral view of the
good city, a sentiment strongly echoed by Bond (2003) who has argued that the core
characteristics of post-apartheid urban policy resulted, through unintended effects, in
an equally oppressive structured process that can be termed class apartheid. As a
result, he goes on to elaborate a variety of specific problems associated with
apartheid-era urban underdevelopment continued—and were in may cases exacer-
bated—during the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century. In sum then, a
growing body of literature has begun to argue that compaction-integration appears to
offer little to the urban poor, especially those on the periphery of the city, and, in the
context of a larger emphasis on development local government and more recently a
powerful discourse on cities and global competitiveness, new urban policy
formulations are seen to be worthy of investigation.
This is not to gainsay the importance of compaction-integration strategies in
opening up a wider variety of spaces and opportunities. Indeed, locations close to
areas of employment, economic opportunities, facilities and services are still
significant for large groups of people. As Todes (2000) has observed, this debate
has helped to avoid gross peripheralisation of the urban poor and brought questions
of accessibility to the fore. Additionally, it has focused attention on the need to
reconstruct township and informal areas and does, in part, weaken old divides.
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Pieterse (2003) has noted that perhaps the problem has less to do with integration as
a strategy per se and that outcome failures need to be seen against the deeper
problem of weak conceptual anchoring of the policy objectives and instruments,
especially the failure to deal with divergent and conflictual interests in the city. We
would also venture to add here that contrary to what the second wave of inter-
national research on urban policy in the developing world has had to say, that part of
the problem may have to do with the fact that instead of semi-autonomously
nurturing a desired form of the urban system that was robustly conceived in the early
1990s, policy makers have since subjugated the urban system to support the larger
goal of accelerated economic growth which, whilst generating relative macroeco-
nomic stability, has, to a large degree, failed to generate positive microeconomic
developmental and employment advances. In other words, national urban policy
goals may have been too embedded in overall development strategies and macro-
and sectoral planning.
Ten years into democracy, the fact remains that a set of sustainable urban policies
that talk to the multiple and competing demands and challenges of our cities has yet
to emerge. Whilst positive inroads have been made, institutional fragmentation,
competing discourses on development, limited policy and programme capacity at a
local level, a lack of rigorous research in the preparation of policy and the temptation
to invoke international best practice solutions in the reconstruction of our cities, has
meant that we are at present, if not operating in a total policy void, reconfiguring our
cities through ‘policy’ trajectories devoid of meaningful substance and content. It is
a matter that needs urgent redress if the twin—and mutually reinforcing—concerns




There have been three components to urban policy in South Africa up to 2004.
Policies to which close attention has been paid include those that gave effect to the
‘One city, one tax base’ slogan that emerged during the township struggles. These
policies included re-demarcating municipalities to create integrated and democratic
local governments, the comprehensive restructuring of the local government system
and the design of municipal financial systems that support service delivery to the
poor. Another set of policies revolves around the creation of ‘developmental local
governments’ and includes integrated development planning and local economic
development. A last set of policies refers to the mass delivery of free housing and
services within municipalities.
National, provincial (in the case of housing) and municipal and sectoral policies
over the past decade have sought to enable local government to undertake delivery,
plan for delivery and implement delivery in consolidating democracy. Thus,
government’s urban policy has focused on meeting the commitment in the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to provide for the basic needs
of all South Africans and building democratic local government institutions and
enhancing their ability to promote socioeconomic development in urban areas.
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Backdrop
At the time of the 1994 democratic elections, South African cities were characterised
by dire housing and services backlogs, inequalities in municipal expenditure, the
spatial anomalies associated with the ‘apartheid city’, profound struggles against
apartheid local government structures, high unemployment and many poverty-
stricken households.
The African National Congress’ (ANC) commitment to addressing these issues
can be traced to the 1994 RDP, which committed government to meeting the basic
needs of all South Africans. Housing and services such as water and sanitation, land,
jobs and others were counted as basic needs. The RDP also included the
commitment to the restructuring of local government with a view to meeting these
needs. The ANC recognised the key role of local government in delivering services
and promoting economic development and called for the re-demarcation of local
governments with a view to urban integration and democracy, the creation of a single
tax base and the cross-subsidisation of municipal expenditure. Local governments
were to become central to overcoming the backlogs.
However, the ANC confronted a fundamental difficulty. At the time, it was
unknown how many households suffered from services backlogs, what household
incomes were and what services levels they might afford, whether local governments
had the capacity to deliver services as well as knowledge of alternative means of
ensuring service delivery such as public–private partnerships, and how the capital
and operating costs of the services might be financed. Indeed, there was only inexact
data regarding the number of households in urban and rural areas. The same
difficulties were not experienced in the case of housing, as the housing backlog had
been estimated at the National Housing Forum (1992–1994) in the broadest possible
terms as being 1.5 million units.
It was due to this lack of household and services information and a lack of clarity
regarding options for delivering services that in 1995, the first version of the
Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF) was prepared (Ministry in
the Office of the President and the Department of Housing 1995). All too often
based on informed guesstimates, the MIIF provided the ‘missing’ data and suggested
how services might be delivered and financed.
At the same time as the MIIF was prepared, government was putting in place the
preconditions for the ‘One city, one tax base’ policy: re-demarcating and creating
integrated local governments in time for the 1995 and 2000 local government
elections, with the latter being viewed as the ‘final stage’ in the creation of
‘developmental local government’. Examples of the policies and policy frameworks
that emerged over time include integrated development planning, local economic
development, free basic services and municipal services partnerships. Housing
policy was an exception to this transformation because in 1992, negotiations began
in the National Housing Forum, and by the time of the 1994 democratic elections,
what was, in effect, a draft housing White Paper was in place.
Many urban policies have subsequently been revised in the light of experience
and, importantly, also as government extended its democratic agenda. Free basic
services provide an example. During the 1980s, one of the means employed to
oppose the Black Local Authority system was a boycott on payment for rent and
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services. A decade and a half later, after it became clear that the widespread failure
to pay for services showed no sign of stopping and also that many households could
not afford to pay for services, the ANC and later government adopted the free basic
services policy. This represented a break with the earlier principle included in the
MIIF that taking into account the potential for cross-subsidisation, consumers of
water and electricity should pay an amount for services consumed.
The Context for Urban Policy Formulation Post-1994
Population Growth and Urbanisation
In the first instance, the context for urban policy is the size of the urban population,
its location, how rapidly it is growing and where it is growing. The South African
census defines four types of areas: ‘tribal’ (former ‘homeland’), ‘rural formal’ or
‘commercial farming’, ‘urban formal’ and ‘urban informal’.1
At the time of the 2001 census, South Africa’s population was 44,819,318, with
about 57% of the population deemed to be urban and 43% rural. Forty-seven per
cent of the urban population lived in formal urban areas and 8% lived in informal
urban areas. Thirty-five per cent of the rural population lived in tribal areas and 7%
in commercial farming areas. The 3% difference comprises overlapping urban and
rural categorisation—institutional housing, hostels, industrial areas and smallhold-
ings—with 2% being found in urban areas and 1% in rural areas.
The location of most of the urban population is depicted in Fig. 1, which shows
the nine largest cities that are members of the South African Cities Network (SACN)
and also provincial capitals that are not included in the SACN. The SACN cities are
Johannesburg, eThekwini, Cape Town, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, Nelson Mandela,
Buffalo City, Msunduzi and Mangaung. In addition to the cities, Fig. 1 also reflects
population density. Aside from Cape Town, it is apparent that most of the country’s
population lives in the eastern half of the country.
Figure 2 shows the population size and the number of households living in the
cities included in Fig. 1. Johannesburg and eThekwini have more than three million
inhabitants and Cape Town has close to that number. Ekurhuleni and Tshwane follow,
with Ekurhuleni having about 2.5 million inhabitants and Tshwane two million
inhabitants. In practice, the three cities in Gauteng comprise a single conurbation with
a population of 7.7 million persons, approximating what the international literature has
recently referred to as the emergence of global ‘city regions’ (Pillay 2004a, b). The last
city with metropolitan status, Nelson Mandela, has about a million inhabitants, with
Buffalo City, Mangaung and Msunduzi, not classified as metropoles, having much
1These categories are crude. The Development Bank of Southern Africa (2005) points to definitional
problems such as when there are large concentrations of people living in rural areas whose existence is
better characterised as urban. The Bank also points to extended household survival strategies that include
members in urban and rural areas and migration between them. There is considerable potential for
debating the conceptual and empirical bases for the urban/rural distinction, but in a sense, this is
redundant. This introduction serves to situate the reader within the urban policy environment and employs
the data commonly used by government and by policy makers and most academics. It suffices to alert the
reader to misgivings regarding the conceptual underpinnings of the data.
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smaller populations. The smaller populations are also true of Polokwane and
Mbombela, with a considerable drop to Mafikeng and Sol Plaatje. Sol Plaatje is
located in the Northern Cape, which is losing population.
In the case of the SACN cities, the most rapid growth is occurring in Gauteng. As




































































Source:  HSRC 












































Fig. 1 Cities comprising the SACN and provincial capitals. Source: HSRC
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22.2%, 22.4% and 18.0% between 1996 and 2001, respectively, are growing more
rapidly than any other of the SACN cities (SACN 2004a, b: 38). At the same time,
cities like Nelson Mandela, Msunduzi, Mangaung and Buffalo City are growing at a
rate below that of the nation.
The same data are unavailable for the other cities shown in Fig. 1 due to
boundary changes. However, the populations of some other cities are also growing

































































































Source: SACN (2004: 38, 81) 
Fig. 3 Population and household
growth rates of SACN cities,
1996–2001. Source: SACN
(2004a, b: 38, 81)
118 U. Pillay
former are Rustenburg in North West whose platinum mines are booming (4.9% per
annum between the 1996 and 2001 censuses) and uMhlathuze on the KwaZulu-Natal
east coast whose port and industrial activities are growing rapidly (8.07%). In
contrast, in addition to Sol Plaatje (−0.28%), Mathjabeng (−3.07%) in the Free State
is declining rapidly due to decline in the gold mining industry in the area (SACN
2004a, b: 38).
It is as a result of the different growth rates that data pertaining to cities and
overall urbanisation should be read in conjunction with Fig. 4, which shows
population growth between the two census periods, 1996 and 2001. Figure 4 points
to the population decline in the Northern Cape and also many areas in the former
homelands and also to the fact that in many areas, the rural population is growing
more rapidly, often considerably more rapidly, than the national average of 2% per
annum. Aside from growth in Cape Town, in high value mostly wine farming areas
and along the coast north and west of the city, it is apparent that rapid growth is
mostly occurring in the eastern and more northern parts of the country.
It appears that there is also rapid growth in some cities outside Gauteng and also in
certain rural areas. The rural-to-rural migration is probably explained by the absence of
jobs in the metros and larger urban centres, the availability of social grants that reduce
household dependence on cities as possible sources of income and of subsidised
housing and municipal and social services in small towns, predominantly in the
commercial farming areas (Bekker and Cross 1999; Cross 2001).
A last observation regarding the location of urban growth is that most of the
increase in the cities is occurring on the periphery of cities. This has long been
known in the case of the provision since 1994 of subsidised low-income housing
projects, which reinforce the disadvantages of poor access to jobs, social services
and retail facilities, but this distant location phenomenon is also characteristic of new
migrants. This situation is bemoaned by most urban practitioners and by the
government itself in the Department of Housing’s 2004 Breaking New Ground
policy statement where it is observed that:
After the 1994 elections, Government committed itself to developing more
liveable, equitable and sustainable cities. Key elements of this framework included
pursuing a more compact urban form, facilitating higher densities, mixed land use
development, and integrating land use and public transport planning, so as to ensure
more diverse and responsive environments whilst reducing travelling distances.
Despite all these well-intended measures, the inequalities and inefficiencies of the
apartheid space economy, has lingered on (2004: 11).
Household Growth and Housing and Services Backlogs
From the point of view of urban policy, the increase in the number of households is
often more significant than the increase in the size of the population. This is because
the increase in the number of households, together with household incomes,
determines the housing backlog because service connections are made to houses,
flats and so on, because household incomes determine the ability to pay for housing
and services and because these have immediate implications for national budgeting for
the housing subsidy and capital and operating subsidies, municipal finances and so on.
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South Africa has experienced a sharp decline in household size and a
consequent marked increase in the number of households. Between 1996 and
2001, the average number of households in the SACN cities grew by 27.5%, more
than double the population growth rate. In 1996, the average household size was
4.47 persons; in 2001, it was four. If the household size had remained constant at
the 1996 figure, the increase in the number of households would have been about
950,000. The actual increase was 2.13 million households, a difference of 1.18
million households.
Figure 3 shows population and household growth rates and Fig. 5 the differences
in household size among the cities. Combining the two is important because rapid
population growth coupled with declining household size accentuates the housing
and services backlogs in an area. Again, it is the cities in Gauteng that stand out.
The increase in the number of households in Johannesburg was a remarkable
8.05% per annum, about double the national average. Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni
and Tshwane again have the most rapid growth rates. Indeed, with the exception
of Buffalo City, the rate of increase in the number of households in the other
SACN cities is below the national average. The rate of increase in the number of
households in Nelson Mandela and Msunduzi in particular is sharply below the
national average.
Possible explanations for the changes in household size include:
& Households that in the apartheid years suffered from massive overcrowding and
combined, for example, married children with parents, are unbundling.
& The role of migration may also be a consideration. Cross (2001) suggests that a
change in migration patterns is underway. Instead of circular migration, whilst
many householders still talk of returning ‘home’ to rural areas, in practice, what
is happening is that families are, de facto, separating into urban and rural
households. This view is debated and to some degree supported by Russell
(2002). However, Posel (2003) and Cox et al. (2004) disagree with the view that
circular migration is giving way to separate urban and rural households.
& The impact of HIV/AIDS on households is unclear. AIDS deaths have picked up
rapidly since 2001, but were not as profound between the 1996 and 2001



































































Source:  HSRC 
Fig. 5 Average household size
of SACN and selected secondary
cities, 2001. Source: HSRC
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& South Africa has a very young population base, and the rate at which younger
people enter the housing market exceeds the general populations’ growth rate,
leading to smaller average household sizes.
& In regard to the influx of people from across South Africa’s northern borders,
people might come in as individuals and not necessarily as families, thus
reducing the average household size.
& Reportedly, the National Treasury has suggested that the availability of the
housing subsidy has caused families to unbundle for the purpose of obtaining
the subsidy.
The increase in the number of households among the SACN cities should be read
in conjunction with Fig. 6 which points to the rapid growth of households, in excess
of the national average of 4.34% per annum, in many areas of the country aside from
the cities. Compared to areas where a population decline is shown (Fig. 1), there are
fewer areas where there is a decline in the number of households. There is at the
same time a slower than national average increase in the number of households in
many of the former homelands.
The implications of the increase in the number of households are evident in
the housing backlog. Despite the delivery of more than 1.8 million subsidised
housing units completed—or under construction—between 1994 and March
2005, in its 2004 Breaking New Ground document, the Department of Housing











































Source:  HSRC 
Fig. 6 Household growth between 1996 and 2001. Source: HSRC
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The proportions of households in the SACN cities that lack formal housing or
water2 on the stand or in the house are shown in Fig. 7. The proportion of
households in the cities without formal housing ranges between 20% and 38%, with
the three non-metropolitan cities and eThekwini and Ekurhuleni being at the top of
the range. With the exception of Ekurhuleni, it is expected that this is partly because
their demarcation included former homelands. The proportion of households in the
cities without on-site water ranges between 15 per cent and 42 per cent, with
eThekwini and the three non-metropolitan cities being at the top of the range. The
data are a bit difficult to interpret. On the one hand, it makes sense that the cities
whose boundaries include the former homelands will have the largest water
backlogs; on the other hand, it is to be expected that formal houses will have on-
site water, and this is not always the case, for example in Ekurhuleni. Rather than try
to explain the latter differences, one wonders about the data.
Population Projections and the Future Growth of the Cities
One cannot assume that high urban population and household growth rates will
continue. South Africa’s population is growing increasingly slowly, although the
projections that follow do not indicate that HIV/AIDS will lead to negative
population growth. Increasingly, urban growth will be propelled less by the natural
increase of the urban population and more by internal movement within the country
and, perhaps, migration from other countries.
The population projections to 2015, including those for HIV/AIDS, are shown in
Table 1 and are based on the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA) 2002 model
(Dorrington et al. 2004). The projections are for South Africa, and none are available
for cities and for households. Due to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, which the Nelson
Mandela/Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) survey reported as 11.4% in
2002, HIV/AIDS is a determining factor of population growth in South Africa.3
3For comparative purposes, the HSRC projects that 4.6 million persons have HIV/AIDS and ASSA 5
million persons.





















































% of households without formal shelter % of households without on-site water
Source: SACN (2004: 27–31, 80) 
Fig. 7 The percentage of house-
holds without formal shelter and
on-site water in SACN cities,
2001. Source: SACN (2004a,
b: 27–31, 80)
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The ASSA projections to 2015 require assumptions regarding:
& information and education campaigns;
& improved treatment of sexually transmitted diseases;
& voluntary counselling and testing;
& mother-to-child transmission prevention; and
& antiretroviral treatment (Dorrington et al. 2004: 8).
Regarding the overall expected trends for population size, Table 1 shows the total
population for 5-year intervals, the annual population growth rate, the number of
people infected with HIVand accumulated AIDs deaths. Dorrington et al. observe that:
The total population continues to increase over the period, although at a
decreasing rate. From 2011, the expected annual rate of increase is 0.4%. The
number of people infected with HIV peaks in 2013, at just over 5.4 million,
after which it starts to decrease slowly. In contrast, the number of people sick
with AIDS in the middle of each year continues to rise over the period, reaching
nearly 743,000 in 2015. Accumulated AIDS deaths are close to 5.4 million by
the same year. By 2004, it is estimated that over 1.2 million people have already
died as a result of AIDS, just over 5 million are infected with HIV, and over
500,000 are AIDS sick (2004: 23).
According to these projections, population growth will slow from 0.7% per
annum in 2005 to 0.3% in 2015. At the same time, because HIV infection most
affects young adults, beginning at about 20 years old and continuing for another
20 or so years, due to the time lag between infection and death, it is in middle age
that most deaths occur. This is when the dying are raising children and caring for
the elderly. The death of one or more income-earning household members
considerably increases the dependency burden on other household members. This,
together with the large number of mostly working-age adults who are AIDS sick
and in need of care, points to the burden that will be placed on households and the
extended family.
Household Incomes
So far, the focus has been on the urbanisation of the population, the increase in the
number of households, housing and services backlogs and the location of low-
Table 1 Projected population, number of HIV positive, AIDS sick and cumulative AIDS deaths for
1990–2015, ASSA 2002 (default scenario)
Year Total population Annual growth rate (%) Total HIV+ Cumulative AIDS deaths
1990 35,538,787 1.8 38,597 326
1995 40,153,091 2.7 943,590 20,662
2000 43,966,756 1.4 3,731,645 318,697
2005 46,156,343 0.7 5,165,797 1,542,169
2010 47,380,126 0.5 5,408,621 3,404,415
2015 48,294,565 0.3 5,407,945 5,358,501
Source: Dorrington et al. (2004: 24)
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income households within cities. The significance of this material should be
interpreted in the light of changing household incomes. This is because household
incomes above a certain level enable the household to successfully participate in the
private delivery of housing and services, contribute significantly to municipal rates
and services, reduce the need for capital and operating subsidies for municipalities
and so on.
In this regard, Table 2 provides extraordinary statistics regarding employment and
unemployment amongst African and coloured people. Of the urban African and
coloured labour force, 38.7% are without employment and 56.5% are without
formal employment. Although there has been modest growth in formal sector
employment, job creation in this sector has failed to keep pace with the growth in
the labour force.
The negative implications for household incomes are ameliorated by the
availability of social grants. In 1994, the government spent R10 billion on social
grants, and there were 2.6 million beneficiaries. In 2003, the expenditure was R34.8
billion, and there were 6.8 million beneficiaries. It is speculated that it is due to these
grants that there has been a decline in households with an income of less than R800
per month; conversely, it is speculated that it is due to increasing unemployment,
that there has been an increase in households with an income of less than R3,500
per month.
Conclusion
The first 10 years of democracy have seen the creation of democratic, integrated and
developmental local government, mass delivery of housing and services, a finely
crafted array of capital and operating subsidies for delivery to low-income
households and a number of programmes intended to enhance the capacity of local
government to undertake delivery.
New Policies
The future agenda repeats the emphasis on delivery. For example, in A People’s
Contract to create work and fight poverty, the ANC electoral platform for 2004, the
Table 2 Racial incidence of urban employment and unemployment, 2004
African and coloured White
Millions Percentage Millions Percentage
Employee, formal sector 4.3 43.5 1.4 72.5
Employee, informal sector 1.0 10.3 0.0 0.9
Self-employed, formal sector 0.1 1.3 0.3 15.6
Self-employed, informal sector 0.6 6.2 0.1 4.0
Unemployed (broad def.) 3.9 38.7 0.1 7.0
Total 9.9 100.0 1.9 100.0
Source: Calculated from StatsSA, Labour Force Survey, March 2004. The data were provided by Mark
Aliber of the HSRC.
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ANC again commits government to the delivery of housing and services and then to
reducing poverty and unemployment by half through speeding up the delivery of
housing and services, ‘economic development, comprehensive social security, land
reform and improved household and community assets…new jobs, skills develop-
ment, assistance to small businesses, opportunities for self-employment and
sustainable community livelihoods’.
There are four potentially significant new ‘urban policies’. These are the
Presidency’s 2003 National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP), the Depart-
ment of Housing’s 2004 Breaking New Ground document, the Department of
Provincial and Local Government’s Local Economic Development Framework and
the pending, rewritten Urban Development Framework whose location within the
Presidency, the Department of Provincial and Local Government or elsewhere had,
at the time of writing, still to be determined. Each of these policies is briefly
described and commented on later.
It does seem possible, though, that national policies of this sort may be of
declining significance. The reason for this is due to the emergence of the SACN and
the role of the major cities in setting their own and, in some respects, the country’s
urban agenda. As a result, following the review of the four ‘policies’, the
significance of the SACN and the metros is explored.
National Spatial Development Perspective
Within the NSDP, it is noted that it is not, in fact, a policy. Yet others, including
prominent academics and consultants to government on urban policy, view the
NSDP as an ‘incipient urbanisation policy’. Uncertainty is inevitable when the
NSDP is presented as an:
…indicative guideline that will encourage creative interaction and coordination
between departments and spheres of government about the nation’s spatial
priorities. It will function as a basis for discussion and negotiation…the NSDP
will function not as a policy that prescribes expenditure choices, but an
instrument for discussing spatial development priorities for South Africa within
government (Office of the President 2003: 38).
Quoting from the Atkinson and Marais chapter in this book:
The NSDP’s main argument is that areas with ‘potential’ or comparative
advantage should be pinpointed, and thereafter receive priority in the allocation
of resources—in particular, in the allocation of infrastructure funding (‘hard
investments’). Government spending on fixed investment, beyond the obliga-
tion to provide basic services to all citizens, should therefore be focused on
localities of economic growth and/or economic potential in order to attract
private sector investment, stimulate sustainable economic activities and/or
create long-term employment opportunities (Chapter 2).
There are similarities with the Department of Housing’s 1997 Urban Develop-
ment Framework in respect of not being presented as a policy, not being prescriptive,
but rather a ‘policy approach’ and a guide that will ‘foster linkages’.
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A guide presented for discussion does not seem terribly promising unless there is
a political obligation on relevant departments to take it forward. Encouragingly,
President Thabo Mbeki mentioned the NSDP in his 2005 State of the Nation
address. Reportedly, when national ministries are preparing their capital budgets and
when provinces and municipalities are preparing their Growth and Development
Strategies and their IDPs, questions are asked regarding whether these align with the
NSDP. Eight provinces are now more explicit about spatial development
perspectives in their provincial growth and development strategies. In effect, the
intended and possible outcome of the NSDP may be horizontal coordination among
national departments and vertical coordination between national, provincial and local
spheres of government. Perhaps, the NSDP is beginning to serve as an urbanisation
policy of sorts and will continue to do so for as long as there is political weight
behind the guide.
But does the NSDP actually have significance in the case of housing and
services? In the case of housing, the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the
case of Government of the Republic of South Africa vs Grootboom 2001 SA 46
(CC)was that ‘the state’ must provide relief for people in ‘desperate need’ who are
living in ‘intolerable conditions or crises’ situations. In recognition of the right to
housing conferred in Section 26 of the Constitution, the Department of Housing is
required to provide for ‘the fulfilment of immediate needs’. Similarly, the
Constitution and the Grootboom judgment oblige all municipalities to provide
services. It seems reasonable to assume that whereas the NSDP might influence the
location of infrastructure investments for economic development purposes, it will
have less bearing on the allocation and utilisation of resources in the scramble to
provide serviced sites for housing and, in this respect, the realisation of A People’s
Contract.
Breaking New Ground
The purpose of Breaking New Ground ‘is to outline a plan for the development of
sustainable human settlements over the next 5 years, embracing A People’s Contract
as the basis for delivery’ (Department of Housing 2004: 2).
Breaking New Ground is not presented as a new policy. Instead, it is noted that
‘Whilst Government believes that the fundamentals of the policy remain relevant and
sound, a new plan is required…’ (Department of Housing 2004: 7). The document
includes references to a ‘new vision’, ‘enhancement’, ‘amendments’, ‘changes’,
‘redirection’, ‘new systems’, ‘new policy measures’, a ‘new subsidy mechanism’ and
a ‘new plan that will be required to redirect and enhance existing mechanisms’.
President Thabo Mbeki’s view is that there should not be new policies or White
Papers. Instead, the emphasis is on delivery, but Breaking New Ground arguably can
be seen as a new housing policy.
The political underpinnings of Breaking New Ground separate this amended
policy from the 1994 Housing White Paper where private sector agendas and
technical experts held greater sway. Whereas a defining concern in housing policy
was with the sustainability of the financial institutions, in Breaking New Ground, a
defining concern is the sustainability of communities and settlements. The latter is in
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line with the Department of Housing being a signatory to the United Nations 1996
Habitat Agenda and the emphasis therein on sustainable settlements.
Breaking New Ground is a response to the sharp increase in the demand for
housing arising from the decline in household size, increasing unemployment and
numbers of households with incomes that qualify them for housing subsidies, the
supply of housing on the urban periphery, with individual units not becoming
“‘valuable assets’ in the hands of the poor” (Department of Housing 2004: 4) and a
slow down in housing delivery and under-expenditure of provincial housing budgets.
Synthesising from Breaking New Ground, the government’s new housing vision
requires accelerating the delivery of housing as a key strategy for poverty alleviation
and job creation, creating assets, promoting social cohesion and improving quality of
life for the poor, supporting the functioning of the entire single residential property
market to reduce duality within the sector by breaking the barriers between the first
economy residential property boom and the second economy slump, and building
sustainable human settlements in support of spatial restructuring (emphasis in
Breaking New Ground). This is a considerably more ambitious agenda than that in
1994 where the focus was simple: the delivery of a million units within 5 years to
households having a monthly income below R3 500.
Local Economic Development Framework
At the time of writing, the Local Economic Development (LED) Framework was still
unavailable. In the absence of the Framework document, the ensuing observations are
based on the Department of Provincial and Local Government’s (2005: 1–3) LED
implementation guidelines, which are to be included in the Framework document.
These guidelines were prepared following a consultative process involving prov-
inces, (the South African Local Government Association) and key national sector
departments through the Economic and Employment Cluster of Directors General. A
series of consultative workshops were held with independent experts and in the
international donor community. Discussions were also held with tertiary academic
institutions and practitioners. A number of studies also within South Africa and
abroad underpin these guidelines.
1. The aim of these guidelines is to influence the way government practitioners in
all three spheres: understand, approach and implement LED in South Africa.
The policy context for LED guidelines noted in the document combines the
Constitution and the White Paper on Local Government with the mandate of the
Department of Provincial and Local Government. The specific context for imple-
menting LED consists of:
2. The Ten Year Review of government
& The 2004 electoral mandate
& The Medium Term Strategic Framework
& The January 2005 Cabinet Lekgotla
& The Microeconomic Reform Strategy
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Further:
3. A government-wide approach to developing and supporting robust and inclusive
municipal economies is required and should be facilitated through the active and
dynamic alignment of the NSDP, Provincial Growth and Development
Strategies (PGDSs), and District/Metro Integrated Development Plans (IDPs;
and their LED programmes).
If one considers this rather demanding context for local economic planning and
the desire for horizontal coordination among national government departments, as
well as vertical coordination within the three spheres of government, one can
understand why there is so much attention in these various ‘policy’ documents to
‘alignment’, ‘coordination’, ‘harmonisation’, ‘integration’ and so on. This desire for
coordination may become problematical when one notes that economic development
in the cities relies on private investment, which may be little influenced by national
policy for LED.
Urban Development Framework
The 2005 draft Urban Development Framework appears to be an attempt to resurrect
the 1997 Urban Development Framework. However, it is unclear whether the
Framework will actually be finalised and agreed to by Cabinet. This brief assess-
ment is based on an earlier draft of what was then called an Urban Policy/Strategy.
The first observation is, of course, that the significance of the document is dimin-
ished by its having been downgraded from a policy, which requires the approval
of Cabinet, to a Framework that requires the approval of the minister of the de-
partment concerned.
The purpose of the draft Urban Policy/Strategy is to ‘promote’, ‘initiate’ and
‘propose’ (1) a perspective: ‘initial set of practical interventions for investigation’,
‘deeper understanding’, ‘focus on certain policy issues’, ‘debate’, ‘developing a shared
vision’ and (2) coordination: ‘integration and improved service delivery’, ‘alignment
of government policies and programmes’, ‘appropriate funding framework’.
The intention, again, is to promote coordination, integration and alignment with
national political commitments such as A People’s Contract.
The Agenda of the Cities
The counterpoint to the national perspective and frameworks is the agenda of the
cities, especially those comprising the SACN. The SACN and its members have an
increasingly robust role in setting the urban agenda and, in effect, leading urban
policy. Many points contribute to this view.
First, the context for urban policy is ambivalence within government regarding
the preparation of new urban policies. Reportedly, it was following debate within
Cabinet that the NSDP was termed a perspective and not a policy. Breaking New
Ground is presented as an ‘amendment’ or ‘enhancement’ to existing policy. The
LED policy was downgraded to a framework. The Urban Development Framework
is, of course, a framework. This national policy-shy approach to urban policy is in
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part a reaction to past accusations of government policy favouring urban areas
(Development Bank of Southern Africa 2005).
In contrast, in its State of the Cities Report, the SACN, “Through description and
analysis of trends…hopes to set up a strategic agenda for further research, planning
and action…” (SACN 2004a: 5). In addition, with the assistance of the World
Banklinked Cities Alliance, in its 2004 People and Places: An Overview of Urban
Renewal, the SACN unabashedly specifies that, “A national urban renewal policy
framework must be developed as part of a broader South African urban policy
framework” (SACN 2004b: 9), and, in the absence of a national policy framework,
the document also indicates areas where cities can themselves take aspects of the
policy agenda forward. It is further indicated that this should take the form of a City
Development Strategy. City Development Strategies are explained as:
A city development strategy supports cities in this critical decision-making
process and is focused on implementation. It is an action-plan for equitable
growth in cities and their surrounding regions, developed and sustained through
participation, to improve the quality of life for all citizens. The output of a city
development strategy includes a collective city vision and a strategic action
plan aimed at policy and institutional reforms, increased economic growth and
employment, and implementation and accountability mechanisms to ensure
systematic and sustained reductions in urban poverty4 (emphasis added).
As prescribed in City Development Strategies, the cities are taking their de-
velopment forward in partnership with the private sector. The significance of the
relationship with the private sector is that it further emphasises the independence of
the cities from alignment with the national policy direction.
The presumptions and prerogatives of the SACN cities are further contributed to
by the ‘normalisation’ of the urban agenda, with the legislative and institutional
prerequisites for dealing with the aftermath of urban apartheid having been put in
place. For example, the SACN now turns its attention to developing instruments of
urban governance such as ‘an effective regulatory system for land use planning that
addresses the realities of informal settlements’ (Boraine et al. 2005: 4).
To this should be added the role of municipalities in the delivery of housing and
services. The Constitution, regardless of national urban policy, amendments and
frameworks, requires that municipalities invest in services infrastructure for delivery
to low-income households. This requirement is abetted by the Municipal Infra-
structure Grant, which came into effect in 2004–2005, which accords municipalities
increasing independence in the allocation of resources for investment in services
infrastructure. The same can be said for the Department of Housing’s intention to
accredit the cities to deliver houses.
Then, to add to the urban voice, there is increasing recognition of the facts that
poverty is not solely a rural issue and there is an equivalent, if not greater, preva-
lence of poverty in urban areas and that the cities play the central role of driving
economic growth and employment creation (Development Bank of Southern Africa
2005: Chapter 5). Well-run cities are a precondition for both competitiveness in the
4See <http://www.citiesalliance.org/citiesalliancehomepage.nsf/6FF87B591473087C0625687E0058053D/
3D8C401CF45EE33B86256BAC006D5C18?OpenDocument>.
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global economy and for alleviating poverty in both urban and rural (owing to
remittances and migration) areas.
The point is that in a context of ambivalence at the national level in relation to
urban policy, the cities comprising the SACN are proceeding with an urban agenda
that, to a significant degree, is self-defined, enabled by national housing and services
policies and subsidy frameworks and embodied in their commitment to city devel-
opment strategies. The point is also that the SACN agenda influences that of non-
member secondary cities. A useful window through which to examine this devel-
opment is in the planning and preparation ahead of the FIFA World Cup in 2010.
Whilst a national planning blueprint exists (derived from the 2004 Bid blueprint) and
a number of national government departments have assumed responsibility for
driving facets of the planning, it is really the 10 hosts cities themselves, liaising
closely with the Local Organising Committee and FIFA, that are driving this process.
Given strict timeframes and an unforgiving set of obligations and specifications from
FIFA, it seems prudent that the nine host cities are advancing the planning process
in earnest. In doing so, they seem to be further consolidating a trend where cities
themselves have become the lead agents in most facets of urban development,
regeneration and renewal.
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